Lewis v. Bickham

In Lewis v. Bickham, —- F. 4th —-, No. 23-30086 (5th Cir. Feb. 2, 2024), the Fifth Circuit granted Lewis a writ of habeas corpus after finding that the trial court had erred by inappropriately declaring a mistrial during Lewis’s second jury trial.

Lewis went through three jury trials in the same Louisiana state case. The first two were mistried, and he was convicted in the third. This Fifth Circuit decision revolved around the second jury trial.

In that trial, a jury was empaneled even though for some of them it was their last day of jury service. As a result, two jurors had scheduling issues — one was a real estate agent scheduled to do a property showing, and the other needed to pick up her children from school and watch them. When that came to light, it was already 4:00 p.m. on the first day of trial.

The prosecution moved for a continuance, but the court denied that motion. As a result, the parties both agreed to let the trial continue the next day, and the defense suggested the second juror could find someone else to pick up her children if the trial lasted that late into the next day. Nevertheless, the trial court declared a mistrial sua sponte under the mistaken assumption that jeopardy had not yet attached. Louisiana state courts affirmed that decision, so the defendant filed a habeas petition in federal court.

Ruling: Under the Double Jeopardy Clause, if a trial court declares a mistrial over a defendant’s objection, no future trial can be held unless there was a “manifest necessity” for the mistrial. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978). Here, “[t]he scheduling concerns of two jurors in Lewis’s trial [fell] short” of that standard. None of the jurors were “legitimately unavailable.” See Cherry v. Dir., State Bd. of Corr., 635 F.2d 414, 417 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc).

The Fifth Circuit offered a few notes to guide trial courts in future cases. First, it was explicitly “not requiring a trial court to ask any magic words,” but the court “should at the very least inquire about the juror’s availability for trial or a continuance for purposes of the manifest necessity standard.” Second, it reiterated precedent requiring courts to consult with counsel, provide them a chance to object, and conduct “some inquiry and deliberation” before declaring a mistrial.

Because these jurors’ scheduling conflicts did not show “legitimate unavailability,” the Fifth Circuit concluded “that Lewis’s third trial [was] constitutionally barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause,” so it ordered that the writ of habeas corpus must be granted.