United States v. Campos-Ayala
In United States v. Campos-Ayala, —-F.4th —-, No. 21-50642 (5th Cir. 2024) (en banc), the en banc Fifth Circuit affirmed the two defendants’ convictions for possession with intent to distribute marijuana. In so doing, the court rejected the earlier panel opinion, which had found sufficient evidence that the defendants had “possessed” the marijuana.
Holding 1: The evidence was sufficient to convict the defendants. Crucial to this case, the two defendants had been found inside a vehicle laying on top of 283 pounds of marijuana. The panel majority had deemed that insufficient to prove possession, saying it instead showed only presence. But the en banc court rejected that conclusion after a review of the full trial record.
Holding 2: The case did not need to be dismissed even though the Government deported a potential witness. The defendants argued that the Government violated their right to due process by deporting a woman who had been a passenger in the vehicle, because she may have provided favorable testimony had she remained in the United States. As the court acknowledged, “[t]he right to compulsory process is surely implicated where the government removes an alien before defense counsel has had a chance to interview that person.” The court then provided this summary of the relevant law:
“To succeed on this claim, the defendants must make a plausible showing that the testimony of the deported witness would have been mate rial and favorable . . . , in ways not merely cumulative. A defendant must show prejudice. Dismissal should be granted only if there is a reasonable likelihood that the testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.” (cleaned up) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Here, the court held that the deported woman’s testimony would have been cumulative, so the defendants’ challenge failed.
Holding 3: The district court did not err by denying the defendants’ motion to suppress. The defendants had alleged a Miranda violation, noting that they were detained for 20 to 30 minutes after the traffic stop and were questioned during that time.
The Fifth Circuit held that the defendants were not in custody at the time, so Miranda did not apply. The officer’s “initial command to remain in the car was a routine detention to investigate whether there was a crime, not custody or a formal arrest.” During the wait, the officer on scene was “calm and respectful instead of threatening.” This is the key paragraph of the court’s decision:
“Despite the fact that, as the district court stated, Campos was not free to leave, he was not—as a matter of law—in custody. It would have been unrealistic for him to think that he could leave the scene, but that was because he was a passenger in a car driven by a stranger; he was stopped in a remote, unfamiliar location; and he could not drive himself away or reasonably depart on foot. The roadside questioning before Campos was placed into the transport van did not subject him to the type of police interrogation that we have described as coercive.”
Dissent: Chief Judge Richman (joined by Judges Elrod, Graves, and Douglas) dissented because “[a]llowing the convictions in this case to stand fail[ed] to effectuate [procedural] safeguards in three critical respects.” First, the evidence was insufficient; second, the defendant’s statements violated Miranda v. Arizona; and third, because the Government deported an essential witness and thereby prevented the defendants from “mount[ing] an effective defense.”
Chief Judge Richman elaborated on all three points, but we will highlight only one here. Regarding Miranda, she wrote that given this en banc decision, “it is difficult to imagine when—if ever—a routine traffic stop may evolve into Miranda custody in our circuit.”