United States v. Diaz-Diaz
In United States v. Diaz-Diaz, No. 22-50951 (5th Cir. Jan. 3, 2024), the Fifth Circuit affirmed two defendants’ trial convictions related to their involvement in the murders of three people in Mexico. The court also affirmed the imposition of an obstruction-of-justice sentencing enhancement, but it vacated the sentence on three counts because the district court had been mistaken about its discretion to order concurrent sentences.
Ruling 1: The trial evidence was sufficient to prove conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country even though there was only circumstantial evidence for two of the elements. To convict under 18 U.S.C. § 956(a)(1) “the Government must prove four elements: (1) the defendant agreed with at least one person to commit murder; (2) the defendant willfully joined the agreement with the intent to further its purpose; (3) during the existence of the conspiracy, one of the conspirators committed at least one overt act in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy; and (4) at least one of the conspirators was within the jurisdiction of the United States when the agreement was made.” Here, “the Government relie[d] on purely circumstantial evidence to satisfy elements (3) and (4),” but “circumstantial evidence consistently suffices to support a conspiracy conviction” and “a rational trier of fact could conclude that the Government met its burden.”
Ruling 2: There was no error in applying the obstruction-of-justice enhancement under USSG § 3C1.1, which can be based on pre-investigation conduct if the defendant “(1) believed that there was or would be a governmental investigation and (2) acted to obstruct or impede that investigation.” Here, the conspirators burned the car they had used during the murders, expressly “to conceal evidence implicating [one of them] in thee crimes.” The defendant had argued that he was unaware that any investigation was underway at the time, but the court found that he had “clearly intended to” impede the investigation of the murders and the investigation had begun immediately after the murders. Regardless, any error would have been harmless anyway because the offense level would still have been 43 — the highest possible.
Ruling 3: The trial evidence was sufficient to prove aiding and abetting murder because the affirmative-act element of aiding and abetting “comprehends all assistance rendered by words, acts, encouragement, support, or presence . . . even if that aid relates to only one (or some) of a crime’s phases or elements.” This defendant was not “merely a knowing spectator” — he at least uttered “words of encouragement” during the crime’s commission, and he was armed and ready to shoot if necessary to accomplish the murder.
Ruling 4: The district court erred in its belief that consecutive life sentences were mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j). While the defendants’ appeal was pending, “the Supreme Court held that section 924(c)(1)(D)(ii)’s bar on concurrent sentences does not extend to a sentence imposed under section 924(j). Lora v. United States, 599 U.S. 453, 455, 458 (2023).” As a result, the parties agreed that those sentences should be vacated and remanded for resentencing only as it related to the convictions under § 924(j).