United States v. Estrada-Aguirre

In United States v. Estrada-Aguirre, No. 23-50583 (5th Cir. Sept. 3, 2024) (unpublished), the Fifth Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that the Government was collaterally estopped from charging him with making a false statement in an application for a passport and perjury even though years ago he was acquitted at trial on similar charges.

In 2006, a jury acquitted Estrada-Aguirre of illegal reentry and of making a false claim to United States citizenship. So here, he argued that the jury must have found that he was born in the United States and, as a result, the Government was collaterally estopped from relitigating those issues in this new case.

Collateral Estoppel: The doctrine of collateral estoppel may affect successive criminal prosecutions in two ways: (1) it may “completely bar” the subsequent prosecution if “one of the facts necessarily determined in the former trial is an essential element of the subsequent prosecution,” or (2) if the subsequent prosecution is not completely barred, collateral estoppel may “prohibit[] the introduction or argumentation of facts necessarily decided in the prior proceeding.”

Here, Estrada-Aguirre failed to prove that the 2006 jury “necessarily found” that he was born “in Hot Springs, Brewster County, as Jose Lopez Aguirre” because that trial had included several names for him and had involved “competing evidence” regarding his date of birth. “The jury could have rationally determined that Estrada-Aguirre was born in the United States without necessarily determining his birth name and exact county of birth, or the jury could have determined the Government failed to prove the other elements of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.”

Even if the jury had necessarily determined that Estrada-Aguirre was a U.S. citizen, he would still lose here because citizenship was not “an essential element” of the crimes with which he was charged in the new case. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1542, the Government was required to prove Estrada-Aguirre “willfully and knowingly ma[de] any false statement in an application for a passport with intent to induce or secure the issuance of a passport under the authority of the United States.” So in this second trial, the jury “could have found that Estrada-Aguirre made a false statement as to his name and place of birth, without making a finding as to his citizenship.”

In addition, “the Government was not precluded from introducing evidence to show that Estrada-Aguirre was not born in the United States,” because the earlier acquittal did not “preclude the Government from relitigating an issue when it is presented in a subsequent action governed by a lower standard of proof.” Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 349 (1990). Here, “the Government did not have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Estrada-Aguirre was not born in the United States,” so the evidence was governed by a lower standard of proof—was the evidence relevant to the charges?

Finally, the court held that the evidence was sufficient to support both of Estrada-Aguirre’s convictions.