United States v. Gordon

In United States v. Gordon, —- F.4th —-, No. 22-50043 (5th Cir. Feb. 16, 2024), the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Gordon’s motions to dismiss based on violations of his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial. In particular, the court joined its sister circuits in upholding continuance orders based on the COVID-19 pandemic.

Gordon was first arrested in December 2019, but his trial was delayed until May 2021, largely due to delays related to the COVID-19 pandemic. In December 2020, Gordon filed a motion to dismiss his indictment based on speedy-trial violations, but the district court denied that motion, explaining that these delays were district-wide, due to an unforeseen pandemic, and exempted from the typical Speedy Trial Act calculations. The court noted some concern that Gordon’s constitutional right to a speedy trial might eventually be violated if the pandemic continued, but it did not find a violation at that time.

Ruling 1 (Speedy Trial Act): Under the STA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161 & 3162, a defendant’s trial is supposed to begin within 70 days of his indictment or initial appearance, whichever is later, but the STA also exempts certain types of delays from that calculation. Two of those exemptions applied here: (1) delays resulting from the filing of pretrial motions, and (2) delays resulting from the judge’s findings that the ends of justice served by the delay outweigh the need for a speedy trial. Here, the Fifth Circuit determined that “454 of the 461 days between Gordon’s initial appearance and trial are properly excludable from the speedy trial calculation” on those two grounds. As a result, his trial occurred well within the statutory 70-day limit, so there was no STA violation.

The Fifth Circuit also rejected Gordon’s argument that the district court’s sua sponte continuances failed to include the necessary findings, specific to his case, for why the ends of justice weighed in favor of delay. Here, the district court made sufficient findings both in this specific case and by explicitly incorporating district-wide continuance orders based on “the continued severity of the risk … [from] the spread of COVID-19.” The court noted that its “sister circuits that have addressed the issue have uniformly upheld district court decisions to stop the STA clock during ends-of-justice continuances that were based on the COVID-19 pandemic.” As a result, the district court did not err in denying Gordon’s motion to dismiss on STA grounds.

Ruling 2 (Sixth Amendment): Under the Sixth Amendment, criminal defendants “shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,” and the Supreme Court has directed that courts should apply a four-factor balancing test to evaluate claimed violations of that right. Courts consider: (1) the “length of delay,” (2) “the reason for the delay,” (3) “the defendant’s assertion of his right,” and (4) “prejudice to the defendant.” See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). In Gordon’s case, the first factor favored Gordon, but the other three weighed against him: the reason for delay was neutral (COVID-19), Gordon waited 322 days to file a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds, and Gordon failed to show anything beyond “speculative prejudice” from the delay. As a result, the district court did not err in denying Gordon’s motion to dismiss on constitutional grounds.