United States v. Maria E. Garcia

In United States v. Garcia, —- F.4th —-, No. 22-40570 (5th Cir. Apr. 23, 2024), the Fifth Circuit rejected several challenges to the defendants’ money-laundering convictions and to one of their sentences. The defendants presented multiple arguments, a few of which are summarized below.

Background: At trial, the Government presented evidence about the Villalobos drug trafficking organization, which “moved hundreds of kilograms of cocaine [from Mexico to the United States] and had yearly profits in the millions.” This case centered on two searches and seizures, during which federal agents found large sums of money in the possession of the two defendants, Maria Garcia and Liang Yu.

Issue 1: Was the evidence sufficient to prove the defendants’ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? Held: Yes.

First, the jury was entitled to infer Garcia’s guilt despite receiving no direct evidence that she had entered any agreement to transport money. She admitted being recruited by someone in Mexico to receive money and transfer it to other people, and agents seized $196,715 of concealed cash from the car of a person who left her house. From that, the jury could infer an agreement between Garcia and others, and the jury could infer that the purpose of the agreement was to transport money to Mexico.

Second, the Government presented sufficient evidence of both defendants’ intent to promote the distribution of a controlled substance even though neither was directly involved with drugs. 18 U.S.C. §1956(a)(2)(A) has a “stringent” intent requirement, and the Fifth Circuit has often affirmed convictions when the defendants had been “exposed to or told about drugs.” Here, however, the court relied on out-of-circuit precedent that “a defendant’s extensive participation in an organization is sufficient circumstantial evidence that he knew of the organization’s illicit activities. See, e.g., United States v. Prince, 618 F.3d 551, 560 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Huezo, 546 F.3d 174, 182 (2d Cir. 2008).”

Third, the jury was entitled to infer Yu’s intent to promote drug trafficking because of “the scale of the [drug organization’s] operations, that it trusted Yu with millions of dollars multiple times, and Yu’s interactions with several different members of the” organization.” On its face, “transporting large sums of vacuum-sealed money with no apparent legitimate source” was a type of transaction that “indicate[d] an intent to promote” drug trafficking, which distinguished this from cases where the defendant’s actions were, alone, insufficient to “raise suspicions that it [was] furthering the goals of a drug trafficking organization.”

Issue 2: Did the district court err by denying Yu’s motion to suppress without conducting an evidentiary hearing? Held: No.

A district court is only required to hold a hearing on a motion to suppress “when necessary to receive evidence of an issue of fact.” United States v. Harrelson, 705 F.2d 733, 737 (5th Cir. 1983). To prove that necessity, a defendant must allege “sufficient facts which, if proven, would justify relief.” Id. Here, Yu’s “vague three-sentence affidavit" in support of his motion to suppress” was insufficient. It did not “establish what was happening directly before the search [or] that a warrantless search took place.” For that reason, the district court did not err by declining to hold an evidentiary hearing.

Issue 3: Did the district court err by denying his motion to suppress because it reversed the burden of proof? Held: No.

In regard to warrantless searches or seizures, the movant must show that “he was arrested or subject to search without a warrant.” If he does, the burden then shifts to the Government to justify the warrantless search. “Here, Yu’s affidavit did not even establish that the search occurred without a warrant. Although the motion to suppress alleged a warrantless search, ‘counsel’s statements in [a] motion and subsequent briefs are not evidence.’ See INS v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 188 n.6 (1984). Yu’s motion failed to produce evidence of a warrantless search.

Regardless, any error would have been harmless because the trial “evidence was sufficient to convict Yu even if the motion to suppress had been granted.”

Issue 4: Did the district court err by sua sponte raising untimeliness as a basis to deny his motion for a new trial? Held: No.

Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33, a defendant must file a motion for new trial within 14 days after the verdict is rendered, unless hi motion is based on newly discovered evidence. “The Supreme Court has characterized Rule 33 as a non-jurisdictional claim processing rule; as a result, the defense of untimeliness can be forfeited if the Government fails to raise it in response to a motion for new trial. Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005).”

Neither the Supreme Court nor the Fifth Circuit had yet issud a precedential opinion regarding whether a district court may raise timeliness sua sponte when the Government has failed to raise it, but the Fifth Circuit had previously issued an unpublished opinion permitting just such a practice. See United States v. Bouldin, 466 F. App’x 327, 328 (5th Cir. 2012) (unpublished). Here, the Fifth Circuit adopted that unpublished opinion as law. “Because [Yu’s] motion for new trial was not … filed within fourteen days of the date of the verdict …, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion as untimely, even absent a response from the Government.”

Note: Our firm represented Mr. Yu in this appeal but not in the district court proceedings.