United States v. Palmer

In United States v. Palmer, —- F.4th —-, No. 23-20403 (5th Cir. Aug. 1, 2024), the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s findings that officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Palmer’s car and that Palmer had not been subject to “custodial interrogation” when he spoke to the officers.

Reasonable Suspicion for Traffic Stop: At a suppression hearing, a police officer testified that he stopped Palmer’s car because the “front windshield was completely tinted to where you could not see anything inside of the vehicle.” And under Texas law, tint on the front windshield must not extend “more than five inches from the top of the windshield.” Tex. Transp. Code. § 547.613(b)(1)(D). The illegal tint alone was sufficient to justify the officer’s decision to stop Palmer’s car.

Statements: While Palmer was still inside his car, an officer said he smelled marijuana, and “Palmer admitted to having a ‘zip,’ slang for an ounce, of marijuana in his vehicle.” The officer asked Palmer to step out, and he asked, “It ain’t nothing else but weed, right?” While the officer “prepared to handcuff” Palmer, Palmer admitted he had a rifle in the back seat and that he was a convicted felon.

Importantly, “a defendant’s statements are admissible if they are made outside of custodial interrogation.” See United States v. Harrell, 894 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir. 1990). Here, the district court and the Fifth Circuit both found that Palmer was not “in custody” when he admitted possessing the firearm.

Officers had spoken with Palmer “for only a few minutes during a routine traffic stop on a residential street,” and they used a calm tone. In addition, the officers testified that in Harris County, Texas, they release suspects who possess only minor amounts of marijuana if they qualify for a diversion program, and they had planned to release Palmer.

Under those facts, Palmer’s freedom of movement was not restrained to “the degree which the law associates with formal arrest,” and the situation did not create “the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda” v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Because his statements were not the product of “custodial interrogation,” they should not have been suppressed.