United States v. Sterling

In United States v. Sterling, —- F.4th —-, No. 23-30069 (5th Cir. Apr. 25, 2024), the Fifth Circuit rejected the defendant’s “several Sixth Amendment claims in support of his bid to overturn his conviction and sentence following a jury trial in which he appeared pro se.”

Background: After being indicted on 15 counts of fraud and engaging in monetary transactions involving property derived from specified unlawful activity, Sterling was initially represented by appointed counsel. Later, the district court denied Sterling’s request for a different appointed lawyer, and Sterling subsequently elected to proceed pro se. The district court held two hearings on that issue and determined that Sterling competently waived his right to counsel.

A jury ultimately convicted Sterling on all counts, and he was sentenced to 132 months in prison. On appeal, Sterling raised five issues.

Issue 1: The district court did not violate the Sixth Amendment by denying Sterling’s motion for substitute appointed counsel. An indigent criminal defendant has a right to counsel, but “he does not have a right to be represented by a particular lawyer, or to demand a different appointed lawyer except for good cause.” United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993, 995 (5th Cir. 1973) (citation omitted).

On this issue, the district court had conducted a “47-minute hearing to explore Sterling’s concerns.” The court also asked numerous questions and “was conscientious in evaluating Sterling’s concerns to its satisfaction, which was reflected in the comprehensive detail included in the written order denying the motion.” The court did not err in finding no actual conflict, and “more is required than the dislike or distrust of which Sterling complains to constitute an irreconcilable conflict.” A defendant “a defendant need not always show a near total lack of communication with his lawyer to prove irreconcilable conflict,” and the district court could have granted Sterling’s motion; but it was not required to grant it.

Issue 2: The district court properly found that Sterling’s choice to proceed pro se was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The court held two hearings before making that decision, and Sterling’s requests were clear, repeated, and unequivocal. His decision to waive his right to counsel was also voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The court’s inquiries “closely followed those recommended in the Benchbook for U.S. District Court Judges,” and it inquired “into Sterling’s education and background, ensure[d] Sterling understood the nature and severity of the charges against him, and explain[ed] in detail the dangers of self-representation.” The court also sufficiently considered Sterling’s mental health before making its decision.

Issue 3: Where “a court has reasonable cause to question the defendant’s competency, it must appoint counsel for the defendant until that doubt is extinguished,” but here, these facts did not show cause for the district court to doubt Sterling’s competence.

There is a circuit split regarding whether a pro se litigant can represent himself at a competency hearing, and the Fifth Circuit had not yet decided the question. The court considered decisions from the other circuits before adopting the Sixth Circuit’s position that “a finding of competency at one point of the proceedings may be overcome later by further evidence that a defendant is not competent.” United States v. Ross, 703 F.3d 856, 867 (6th Cir. 2012). And if there is “reasonable cause” to doubt a defendant’s competence, counsel must be appointed.

Issue 4: The district court did not err in finding Sterling competent to represent himself at trial. “Due process prohibits the prosecution of a defendant who is not competent to stand trial.” Dunn v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 302, 305 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit will on reverse a competency finding if it was “clearly arbitrary or unwarranted.” Here, Sterling failed to meet that standard.

Issue 5: The district court did not err by denying Sterling’s requests for a competency evaluation and hearing before sentencing. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit considers three factors when evaluating a district court’s decision not to hold a competency hearing: “(1) any prior medical opinion on competency, (2) the defendant’s demeanor at trial, and (3) any history of irrational behavior.” United States v. Teijeiro, 79 F.4th 387, 393 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing United States v. Messervey, 317 F.3d 457, 463 (5th Cir. 2002)).

Under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a), district courts are required to conduct a competency hearing “if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.” See United States v. McEachern, 465 F.2d 833, 837 (5th Cir. 1972).

The court held two hearings on that question and focused on a “joint submission of over two thousand pages” of medical records. “[N]othing in the evaluations contained evidence of a mental disease or defect that would render Sterling mentally incompetent to proceed in the case.” The court’s finding of competence was not an abuse of discretion.