Supreme Court Recap: Criminal Cases
July 2024
To view a pdf version of this article, please click here.
Last month, the Supreme Court issued a whirlwind of decisions, many of which have received significant attention. In this month’s newsletter, we focus on three of those decisions, each of which we previewed in past months’ newsletters.
I. Rahimi: Dangerous People Can Be Disarmed
In United States v. Rahimi, the Court analyzed the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8), which prohibits people subject to domestic violence restraining orders from possessing a firearm. As we explained in an earlier newsletter, the Supreme Court was “poised to issue a second pivotal Second Amendment decision in as many years.” [1]
Summary. On June 21, the Court issued a 103-page opinion written by Chief Justice Roberts.[2] Only Justice Thomas dissented. In sum, the Court found that this law “fits comfortably” within a long American tradition of “barring people from misusing weapons to harm or menace others.” Although Americans have a “fundamental right” to keep and bear arms, that right is not unlimited.
The Court wrote, in part, to correct what it deemed lower courts’ misunderstanding of Second Amendment methodology. History and tradition are an essential consideration, the Court explained, but we do not have “a law trapped in amber.” “[T]he Second Amendment permits more than just those regulations identical to ones that could be found in 1791.” A regulation “must be analogous enough [to historical laws] to pass constitutional muster,” but it “need not be a ‘dead ringer’ or a ‘historical twin.’”
Moving forward, courts will analyze gun regulations by asking whether a specific law is “consistent with the principles that underpin our regulatory tradition,” which means the law is “relevantly similar” to laws that were traditionally permitted. To withstand scrutiny, a law must “regulate[] arms-bearing for a permissible reason,” and it must do so to an extent not “beyond what was done at the founding” of the country.
Practical Takeaways. The Court suggested that “[d]iscerning and developing the law in this way is a commonplace task for any lawyer or judge,” but lower courts are likely to continue disagreeing about how to apply this framework to other gun laws.
For instance, in the few weeks since Rahimi was issued, one district court has struck down 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5), which prohibits gun possession by a person unlawfully in the United States, while another district court rejected a challenge to the same law.[3] And the Ninth Circuit has granted en banc rehearing to decide if 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which disarms felons, is constitutional.[4]
II. Fischer: Obstruction of Justice
In Fischer v. United States, the Supreme Court narrowed the meaning of a general obstruction provision in 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2).[5] As we previously mentioned, federal courts had “adopted two main views of how to interpret that statutory text,”[6] and the Supreme Court has now resolved that split.
Summary. On June 28, the Supreme Court held that § 1512(c)(2) “makes it a crime to impair the availability or integrity of records, documents, or objects used in an official proceeding in ways other than those specified in” the preceding statutory subsection. Chief Justice Roberts wrote the majority opinion, from which Justices Barrett, Sotomayor, and Kagan dissented.
To recap, § 1512(c)(1) prohibits altering, destroying, mutilating, or concealing a record, document or other object “with the intent to impair the object’s integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding.” The next subsection, § 1512(c)(2), prohibits “otherwise” obstructing, influencing, or impeding any official proceeding. That “otherwise” clause, the Court held, must be interpreted “in light of the limited reach of the specific provision that precedes it.”
The specifics, however, remain mirky. Yes, § 1512(c)(2) prohibits efforts to “impair the availability or integrity of records, documents, or objects used in an official proceeding,” mirroring the prohibition in the preceding subsection, § 1512(c)(1). But the Court also suggests that the law may prohibit “impairing the availability or integrity of other things used in an offical proceeding … such as witness testimony or intangible information.” As Justice Barrett explains in dissent, “[w]hile the Court insists that (c)(1) limits (c)(2), it cannot seem to settle on the ‘common attribute’ in the first subsection that cabins the second.”
Practical Takeaways. This case arose from the prosecutions surrounding the events of January 6, 2021. Fischer himself was accused of trespassing into the Capitol building and becoming “involved in a physical confrontation with law enforcement.” Since Fischer was decided, the Department of Justice has begun dismissing obstruction charges in other January 6 prosecutions.[7]
In other cases, however, there are dozens of other obstruction statutes that may apply. As the Court noted, “[f]ederal obstruction law consists of numerous provisions that target specific criminal acts and settings.” Left unchecked, an overbroad interpretation of § 1512(c)(2) would have “largely obviate[d] the need for that broad array of other obstruction statutes.” Those other laws are unaffected by Fischer.
III. Snyder: Bribery vs. Gratuity
In Snyder v. United States, the Supreme Court evaluated whether 18 U.S.C. § 666 prohibits gratuities for past acts or only before-the-fact, quid pro quo bribes.[8] The circuit courts had split on that question,[9] with the Fifth Circuit taking the minority position that only bribes were covered.[10]
Summary. The Supreme Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit’s view that “§666 is a bribery statute and not a gratuities statute,” in large part because the statutory text “strongly suggests” that interpretation. Moreover, because the law applies to millions of state and local officials, a gratuities interpretation “would significantly infringe on bedrock federalism principles.” The Court summed up its decision this way:
A state or local official can violate §666 when he accepts an up-front payment for a future official act or agrees to a future reward for a future official act. … But a state or local official does not violate §666 if the official has taken the official act before any reward is agreed to, much less given. Although a gratuity offered and accepted after the official act may be unethical or illegal under other federal, state, or local laws, the gratuity does not violate §666.
Practical Takeaways. This decision makes it more difficult for federal prosecutors to charge state or local officials with bribery, because in every case, they must now prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the official entered a quid pro quo agreement to take a certain action in exchange for payment or a reward. Even so, “state and local governments have adopted a variety of approaches to regulating state and local officials’ acceptance of gratuities,” and Snyder does not displace any of those laws.
[1] https://klfirm.law/rahimi-and-bruen-progeny
[2] https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-915_8o6b.pdf
[3] United States v. Benito, No. 3:24-CR-26, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117430 (S.D. Miss. July 3, 2024) (Reeves, J.); United States v. Alvarez, 4:20-CR-297, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111810 (S.D. Tex. June 25, 2024) (Lake, J.). We note that Benito involved an as-applied challenge, while Alvarez rejected a facial challenge to the law.
[4] United States v. Duarte, No. 22-50048, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 17601 (9th Cir. July 17, 2024)
[5] https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-5572_l6hn.pdf
[6] https://klfirm.law/obstruction-of-justice-legal-challenges-to-18-usc-1512c
[8] https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/23-108_8n5a.pdf
[9] https://klfirm.law/snyder-v-united-states-does-federal-bribery-law-criminalize-gratuities
[10] https://klfirm.law/federal-bribery-us-v-hamilton
KHALIL & LAKE is a white-collar litigation boutique focusing on federal criminal law, appeals, and complex investigations in a variety of business sectors. If you have any questions about these issues, or if you would like a copy of any materials mentioned here, please let us know.