United States v. De Bruhl-Daniels
In United States v. De Bruhl-Daniels, —- F.4th —-, No. 22-20650 (5th Cir. Oct. 11, 2024), the Fifth Circuit vacated De Bruhl’s conviction for obstruction under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), but it affirmed her conviction and sentencing enhancement for providing false statements in a way that “involve[d]” international terrorism, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a).
Background: Leatrice De Bruhl-Daniels was a former special agent with the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (“NCIS”). This case arose from her interactions with a Syrian national (Nadal Diya) who became the target of multiple federal investigations, including an FBI fraudulent passport and counterterrorism investigation. De Bruhl pled not guilty and proceeded to trial, where she was convicted of “twelve counts relating to her conduct and sentenced to 108 months’ imprisonment.”
The trial evidence showed that De Bruhl met Diya while stationed in Dubai. The court summarized the evidence this way: “relationship with Diya began professionally, then became personal, and ultimately developed into a romantic one. During their relationship, De Bruhl divulged confidential information to Diya, despite repeated warnings from colleagues about her entanglement with Diya and the risks of such disclosures.”
Holding 1: There was sufficient evidence to convict De Bruhl of making false statements involving international terrorism, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a). Section 1001 typically carries a 5-year statutory maximum, but that is increased to eight years if “the offense involves international or domestic terrorism.”
On appeal, the issue was “the degree to which an offense must ‘involve’ terrorism to trigger § 1001(a)’s enhancement.” De Bruhl argued that the statute requires “a connection to specific acts of terrorism,” while the Government contended that “misconduct more generally linked to terrorism—e.g., compromising a counterterrorism investigation and then lying to cover it up—suffices.”
The Fifth Circuit ultimately sided with the Government based on “the full statutory scheme.” “International terrorism” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1), and combining that statute with § 1001(a) results in this formulation: “a defendant’s offense must involve an activity that involves a terroristic act under § 2331.” Here, tipping off a person that he was a target of a counterterrorism investigation, “and then concealing it, given [his] suspected activities in support of Iran and ISIS—[was] sufficiently related to international terrorism to submit the charge to the jury.”
Nevertheless, the court rejected the Government’s “overbroad reading of § 1001(a), which might sweep in even incidental proximity or unknowing involvement with a counterterrorism target. Put differently, the Government must prove more than the mere existence of a counterterrorism investigation to impose the terrorism enhancement.”
Holding 2: The terrorism enhancement in 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied; it provides sufficient notice and does not invite arbitrary enforcement. “That § 1001(a) allows for prosecutorial discretion in seeking its enhancement is not unique, and the statute is far from standardless.”
Holding 3: Given the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Fischer v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 2176 (2024), the court vacated one of De Bruhl’s convictions for obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2).
In Fischer, the Supreme Court narrowed the meaning of § 1512(c)(2). Now, it applies only to conduct “obstruct[ing], influenc[ing], or imped[ing] any official proceeding” by tampering with evidence. Fischer, 144 S. Ct. at 2186. There, “evidence” includes physical evidence as well as “other things … such as witness testimony or intangible evidence.” Id. [NOTE: We have written at length about Fischer v. United States and its effect on the crime of obstruction of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c).]
The Fifth Circuit here rejected the Government’s argument that when a target is tipped off that he is under investigation, “the individual could destroy evidence.” That conjecture is insufficient, and the Government identified no “evidence that was purportedly impaired.” For that reason, the court vacated this obstruction conviction, vacated Ms. De Bruhl’s entire sentence, and remanded her case for resentencing.
Note: One of our firm’s lawyers represented Ms. De Bruhl during pretrial proceedings.